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(This article--slightly edited by IBPP--was submitted by Mr. Andrew Chittim, a freelance writer and 
marketing specialist. The article arrived on May 25th--well before the end of the NATO bombing of 
Yugoslavia. In retrospect, however, Mr. Chittim's analysis highlights a number of Issues that are still not 
resolved.) 
 
Does the NATO bombing campaign suggest that significant political objectives can indeed be achieved 
without the employment of ground forces? Mr. Chittim suggests not--in league with some other analysts 
in late May and even today. However, there is a legitimate question as to whether ground forces were 
used--e.g., the attacks of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the increasing talk of employing NATO ground 
forces as the bombing campaign continued, and the gearing up to deploy peacekeeping and 
humanitarian forces proximal to Yugoslavia as the bombing continued. Thus, the notion of victory 
without ground forces may be moot in the present case. 
 
Does the NATO bombing campaign suggest a new 21st century penchant for military intervention based 
on moral as opposed to strategic interests? Mr. Chittim seems to include the moral as a strategic 
interest. Is this always the case, or may moral interests at times not be strategic? May economic and 
political interests at times not be strategic? And how does one delineate political and economic 
contributions to the moral or moral contributions to the political and economic? 
 
What does the NATO bombing campaign suggest about the salience of ethnic identification as a source 
of conflict, competition, and cooperation? Mr. Chittim intimates that the answer is quite complex and 
there is ample data to back this up. At times, Russian authorities seemed to embrace an ethnic 
brotherhood with the Serbs. At the same time or at other times, the same authorities seemed to view 
the Serbs as vehicles to increase Russian power. As another example of complexity, some authorities 
representing many Islamic countries provided variants of support for the Kosovar Muslims--concurrent 
with helping or impeding operational and support activities of various combinations of NATO nation-
states for these same Kosovar Muslims. Yet again, ethnic politics seemed to be calibrated in a Talmudic 
manner by various NATO nation-states--e.g., Greece, Turkey, and Hungary--in supporting or impeding 
NATO interventions at various points on the politico-military continua. 
 
Would the absence of any NATO military intervention have led to ever increasing violence starting from 
Serb against Kosovar Albanian and ending with a conflagration spreading throughout a good part of 
Europe? Mr. Chittim largely discounts this, as do many analysts today. But in international security 
affairs as in other venues of predicting human behavior, substantiating the consequence of what does 
not happen is extremely problematic. Answers to all these questions have bearing on what comes next 
in the Balkans, for US foreign policy, for NATO, and for international conflict resolution. 
 
How does one predict how a foreign policy intervention is perceived by its target and various observers 
as positive or negative reinforcement, omission training, or punishment? In the attempt to achieve 
political objectives, one may less profitably ponder some hypothetical intrinsic or inherent nature of 
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force or kinds of force, diplomacy or kinds of diplomacy, sanctions or kinds of sanctions. Instead, the 
question may be more like how interventions are perceived by both rational and irrational actors, 
targets, and observers in various sorts of settings. Mr. Chittim does not directly deal with this Issue, but 
his writing intimates the Issue's import. 
 
Can one even develop rules, generalizations, and explanations that reliably and validly inform foreign 
policy initiatives? Can one use, as opposed to abuse, history? Are there historical analogies or are all 
threats and opportunities unique thereby excluding thinking, solving, and resolving by analog? Are 
policymakers and their support personnel hopelessly blinded by ideology, careerism, and a vast horde of 
personal and sociocultural constraints? And, if rules, generalizations, and explanations can be 
developed, how robust are their reliability and validity through time? As with all analysts, Mr. Chittim 
must confront these and other epistemological challenges. 
 
Finally, a bit more about the author. While working in United States (US) Army intelligence activities, Mr. 
Chittim earned his M.A. in international relations (with an emphasis on strategic studies) from Boston 
University in Frankfurt, Germany. He may be reached at bradchitt@aol.com.) 
 
Letter to Anna. 
 
Recently, a native Russian friend of mine asked me, "why doesn't the US act to end the misery in 
Kosovo?" She is a compassionate, cosmopolitan woman raised in Moscow, so the ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo is particularly abhorrent to her. And while she is an American citizen, she nonetheless is a 
foreigner in culture and perspective. The purpose of this essay is to answer her simple question. 
 
Since the disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia, Serbia has gone on a rampage, starting four wars in the 
region with Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and now Kosovo. American foreign policy during 
these wars has evolved. Half-hearted action was taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, in round four of 
Serbia's tirade, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has taken action in the region. 
 
There are those who have asked why the US hasn't responded more forcefully, citing the butchery of the 
Kosovars as ample reason to send in ground forces. And it is true that ground forces are the only 
salvation for Kosovo because the bombing campaign, while slowing the carnage, will not stopt it. 
American non-commitment to a ground force solution may be tied to its strategic interests. Or more 
accurately, a lack of vital strategic interests at stake in the Balkans. 
 
This is important because the US contributes the lion's share of leadership, troops, resources, and 
money to NATO. Therefore, American interests drive, to some extent, NATO action. This action has 
limits, of course, and it's not plausible that NATO would act solely on American interests devoid of any 
congruent European strategic interests, but I will touch on that later. 
 
What strategic interests does the US have in the region? Well, as it turns out, very few. The US has no 
significant business interests in the former Yugoslavia. McDonald's does have a point of contact (see 
http://www.mcdonalds.com/corporate/franchise/outside/contacts/contacts.html) for a franchise in the 
Republic of Yugoslavia and in Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia as well. But US trade in the region is 
miniscule. Compared to Canada, our largest trading partner, regional trading accounts for less than 3/10 
of 1% at $364M. (According to http://census.gov/foreign-trade/sitcl/1998, US trade with Canada was 
$154,152M, Albania $15M (.010% of Canada (oC)), Bosnia-Herzegovina $40M (.026% oC), Croatia $97 
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(.063% oC), Macedonia $15M (.010% oC), Slovenia $123M ((.080% oC), and Yugoslavia $74M (.048% 
oC)). 
 
Thus, conflict in the region would not result in the disruption of the national (US) economy, and, by 
extension, economic strategic interests for the US would not be threatened. This is in direct contrast to 
the projected noxious economic consequences that would have resulted from uncontested Iraqi 
aggression in the Persian Gulf in 1991. 
 
Given that there are no substantive economic strategic interests in the Balkans, what other interests 
might have spurred recent NATO action (at the request of the US)? Military strategic interests in the 
region are also insignificant--to the US and, by extension, NATO. No one can make a credible argument 
that the Republic of Yugoslavia represents a pernicious military threat to anyone but its immediate 
neighbors. So, NATO is not responding to military strategic interests in the region. 
 
Statements that conflict in the region could lead to a major war are overstated in the extreme. If Russia 
were to Issue an ultimatum to NATO to cease its bombing campaign or risk direct military action, then 
NATO would back down. To do otherwise would be incompetence in the conduct of US foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Russia has not Issued such as ultimatum, for while it has an interest in the region, it, too, 
has been averse to facing off against NATO. 
 
What about political strategic interests? Is the Republic of Yugoslavia a major player on the world 
political stage? No. Is it influencing other nations whose relations with the US are considered 
strategically important? Arguably, Russia is being influenced by what they see as their ethic "brothers" 
and fellow Slavs suffering at the hands of the NATO "aggressors." Russia has made rumblings suggesting 
more than political support of Serbia if NATO doesn't cease its operations, but they are only rumblings 
to date and, all in all, US relations with Russia have not been appreciably altered. 
 
So what American interests are being served through NATO's actions? Some say President Clinton felt 
impelled to act for fear of losing face. Having repeatedly threatened military action against Serbia but 
not backing it up, Clinton considered his "credibility" at stake and acted out of political interests. Recall 
also that the first air strikes came amidst the impeachment proceedings against the President. However, 
it is difficult to conceive that impeachment proceedings motivated a sitting President to place America's 
sons and daughters in harm's way. 
 
Political interests explain some of the motivation driving American foreign policy in the Balkans, but 
there is more. "Humanitarian" strategic interests spurred by moral outrage over ethnic cleansing (i.e., 
genocide) seems to be driving NATO. This conceptually new strategic interest--the imposition of 
Western standards of justice in countries that have grossly violated those standards--lends insight to 
NATO's actions. 
 
And while the US leads the alliance, it requires consensus or at least complicity to activate military 
action. European consensus resulted from its revulsion at the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And because 
European strategic interests were directly aligned with the US, NATO acted. 
 
For the US, there is precedent for deploying troops to serve humanitarian interests. Such interests 
would include stemming starvation or factional warfare wrecking havoc on a foreign nation. This was 
the case in 1993 when US Army Rangers found themselves in Mogadishu. But sending troops in support 
of humanitarian interests lost momentum in the wake of the Mogadishu firefight that brought home 
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American soldiers in body bags. And, of course, the pallor hanging over post-Vietnam America still 
lingers. And to mitigate the US commitment to humanitarian interests still further, the US has no 
significant ethnic or cultural ties to the people of Kosovo. 
 
So, the US's commitment to humanitarian interests is lukewarm at best. That's not to say that American 
troops won't someday find themselves in Kosovo, but it will be a hard sell to the US Congress and 
citizenry--people who don't share the President's firm commitment to humanitarian interests at the 
expense of American lives. Already, (US) public support of the bombing campaign, into its third month 
(as of this writing), is waning. 
 
American foreign policy in the Balkans is greatly influenced by the absence of firm, traditional strategic 
interests there. Subsequent NATO action in Kosovo is then based on an unstable foundation of 
ephemeral humanitarian interests and this explains a lack of commitment to stopping Serbian 
aggression through the use of ground troops--the only true and final counterstroke to genocide in 
Kosovo. 
 
It's not that Europeans and Americans don't care. It's just that they have no vital economic, military, or 
political strategic interests at stake. Serbia, by contrast, has every conceivable strategic interest being 
threatened by NATO. That alone makes Serbs more firmly committed to achieving their objectives than 
NATO. And while commitment alone does not assure an outcome, the Serbian threshold for acceptable 
combat casualties is higher than NATO's. This is the Serbian trump card--in play long before the first 
NATO soldier sets foot on "Serbian" soil. (To address the Issues raised in this paper IBPP suggests the 
following references: Atwater, L.E., Camobreco, J.F., et al. (1997). Effects of rewards and punishments 
on leader charisma, leader effectiveness and follower reactions. Leadership Quarterly, 8, 133-152; Deng, 
F.M. (1996). Identity in Africa's internal conflicts. American Behavioral Scientist, 40, 46-65; Le Poire, B.A., 
Erlandon, K.T., & Hallett, J.S. (1998). Punishing versus reinforcing strategies of drug discontinuance: 
Effects of persuaders' drug use. Health Communication, 10, 293-316; Levkovich, V.P., & Andrushchak, 
I.B. (1996). Ethnocentrism as a social psychological phenomenon: Findings of a study of ethnic groups in 
Uzbekistan. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 34, 46-67; O'Connor, S.C. (1998). 
Intergroup conflict: The discursive battle over Quebec independence. Journal of Social Issues, 54, 777-
794; Rieff, D. (1999). Moral imperatives and political realities. Ethics & International Affairs, 13; U.S. 
policy--Balancing strategic and humanitarian concerns. (March 1, 1999). Congressional Digest, 78(3), 
ISSN: 0010-5899; Wong, W-c., & Sun H-f. (1998). Modes of historical view among young citizens in Hong 
Kong before the changeover of sovereignty. Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the 
Orient, 41, 235-246.) (Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Ethnocentrism, Moral, North Atlantic Treaty 
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